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The present study focused upon

~oth

behavioral and cognitive as-

pects of sympathetic responses in preschool children.

Subjects, 36

boys and girls aged 33-75 months, were seen at their regular day care
center.

An

attempt was made to promote comforting behavior through the

use of a peer model both alone and accompanied by an adult's inductive
statement regarding the consequences of a sympathetic response; a six
year-old girl served as the sympathetic model and as an apparently injured victim in need of comforting.

In addition, age- and sex-related

relationships for the measures of social cognition, affective perspec-

2

tive-taking and knowledge of strategies for intervening when another
.,.

l

person's plight invites sympathetic concern, were examined.

The former

1

measure employed a commonly used task presenting children with picture
stories in which a target character's facial expression is not congruent with information provided.by the story situation.

Such stimuli

have been thought to assess the ability to assume the emotional point
of view of a particular person (empathic judgment), as opposed to the
egocentric projection of one's own perspective onto another (projective
judgment).

Capacities for recognizing and explaining situationally

consistent emotions (social comprehension and explanation of affect)
and explaining the incongruent facial and situational cues (awareness
of discrepancy) .were also. evaluated.

The psychometric properties of

(,

1

these measures were a major concern; consequently, internal consistency
reliability as well as age- and sex-related differences among item
means, which were presumed to reflect differences in item difficulty,
were examined for each component of both measures.

Finally, relation-

ships among all measures were examined.
Neither observing the peer model's sympathetic response nor hearing it labeled and approved by an adult was effective in promoting a
comforting response to the model's feigned injury.

Consequently, the

experimental groups were combined and the scores used in the correlational investigation of relationships among measures.

All parts of the

two cognitive measures except empathic and projective judgments were
significantly intercorrelated and strongly related to age, and these
relationships remained strong when age was partialled out.
more projective judgments than did boys.

Girls made

There were no age differences

3

for empathic judgment, but younger boys made more projective judgments
than older boys •

..

These results challenge the use of incongruent facial and situational stimuli as a measure of perspective-taking, provide evidence of
young children's capacities for sympathetic thought and behavior and

'r
I

.
~
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their understanding of others' emotions, and both raise and illuminate
methodological questions concerning social-cognitive measures of the
type used in this study.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In everyday life, the kinds of behavior which smooth interpersonal relationships and contribute to the development of social consciousness tend to go unnoticed, while violently aggressive acts are
reported far and wide.

This tendency has been reflected in the psycho-

logical literature dealing with children's behavior, where studies of
aggression have in the past far exceeded investigations of altruistic
1t

and prosocial activity.

Currently, the

n~ed

for a more thorough under-

standing of the ways in which positive behaviors of all kinds are acquired, and the conditions under which they are expressed, has become
apparent, and the past few years have seen a surge of interest in chi!dren's prosocial actions.

Sympathetic behavior, the offering of com-

fort or condolence to another person, is an aspect of children's prosocial interpersonal behavior which has received little empirical attention, although studies of empathy, which is often thought to underlie
the expression of sympathy, are not uncommon.

The investigation of em-

pathy in children, however, has involved a controversy regarding the
age at which children are capable of assuming the role or perspective
of another person.

The present experiment was designed to examine .

measures of affective role- or perspective-taking and children's ability
to ·verbalize appropriate responses to others' distress, to investigate
the influence of modeling and verbal elaboration of consequences upon

2

sympathetic behavior (comforting) in children, and to assess relationships among these cognitive and behavioral measures.
Traditional psychological descriptions of the young child suggest
a completely egocentric organism, bent on gratifying its own desires
and oblivious to the needs of others.

Yet anecdotal literature abounds

with incidents which would seem to contradict so bleak a view, as do a
few early observational studies. In one of these, Murphy (1937), observing the free·play of nursery school children, found that they were quite
capable of acts of helping, sharing, comforting, and defending, and,
while these were not high-frequency behaviors, they did occur spontaneously (i.e., without prompting from adults).

She also found that

children who.were most inclined to exhibit these behaviors, which together she called sympathy, were also more inclined to express aggression; in her sample, aggressive incidents
eight to one.

outnumbe~ed

prosocial acts by

Though Murphy's·study has been mentioned frequently,

usually in connection with the unexpected association between sympathy
and aggression, for more than twenty years little interest was shown in
investigating the questions she raised.

The recent decade, however,

has seen a renewal of interest in prosocial and altruistic behavior,
and in the processes by which human beings become sensitive to the concerns of others and willing to exert themselves in another's behalf.
Satisfactory explanation for altruistic and prosocial behavior
has not proven easy to come by.

Both terms refer to behavior that is

carried out for the benefit of another person (Rushton, 1976), but for
altruism the stipulation is usually added that the act be voluntary and
involve some element of self-sacrifice (Wispe, 1978), or at least that
there be no expectation of gain for the actor (e.g., Krebs, 1970;
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Hoffman, 1976; Staub, 1978).

Prosocial behavior is generally defined

in terms of its effect for the recipient ("behavior which benefits
other people," [Staub, 1978, p. 2]) which ignores but does not resolve
the, question of motivation, but the proscription against reward is sometimes added (.e.g., Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977).

The terms are often

used interchangeably even though, as Staub pointed out, behavior which
benefits others may or may not be altrui.stically motivated.

Still, in

everyday life we do see acts which seem ·to fit the definition of altruism.

Since altruistic behavior does not appear to be associated with

a state of deprivation or need in the actor, nor, by definition, with
extrinsic reward, the impetus toward such behavior and the reinforcement
which sustains it are not easily specified.
Empathy, or responsiveness to others' emotions, has in fact been
proposed as a motivational factor underlying various forms of altruistic
behavior (e.g., Feshbach, 1975; Hoffman, 1975, 1981; Iannotti, 1975b;
Mussen & Eisenberg-Berg, 1977), and as a specific prerequisite of sympathetic distress (Hoffman, 1978).

However, research on empathy in

children has been clouded by inconsistency in defining the term.

While

some investigators see empathy as a cognitive response and are concerned
with the child's recognition and understanding of another's feelings,
others require, instead or in .addition, an emotional response.

Yet

even where empathy is considered primarily an emotional response to
others' affect, the importance of cognitive processes in recognizing
and understanding emotion is acknowledged.

It is with these cognitive

aspects of empathic responding that this study is concerned.
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PERSPECTIVE-TAKING:

ASSUMING ANOTHER'S POINT OF VIEW

Investigations of children's ability to understand the emotions
of others have been carried out against the background of Piaget's
characterization of preoperational children as egocentric, trapped
within their own subjective experience and unable to assume the perspectives of other people (e.g., Piaget, 1923/1959; Piaget & Inhelder,

1948/1956).

Viewed in this way, the child's cognitive development in-

volves progressive structural change from early egocentrism to the
mature ability to put one's self in another's place, to infer the subjective experience of the other person.
search concerning

e~9centrism

Consequently, much of the re-

in children has investigated the ability

to take another'·s point of view (i.e., role- or perspective-taking,
which has been considered the converse of egocentrism [Ford, 1979]),
and has questioned when or whether children can make non-egocentric
judgments or charted

developmenta~

changes in their ability to do so.

Selman (1980), for example, has proposed a stage model of interpersonal
understanding based upon children's.ability to distinguish the alternative perspectives held by characters in filmed vignettes involving
socio-moral dilemmas.

~uriel

(1978), noting the wide range of ages at

which children can succeed at various perspective-taking tasks, considers this ability a "method" or way of obtaining information, rather
than a "structural-developmental dimension" (p. 102) of the child's
thought.

In his view, children construct conceptual frameworks or ways

of organizing their understanding of the world which change qualitatively as development proceeds and interaction with the environment occurs.

As the level of conceptual development advances, the child will
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be able to apply information-gathering methods such as perspectivetaking to material of greater variety and complexity.
The preceding views of perspective-taking suggest

~

unitary dimen-

sion or skill, but other researchers have distinguished among perceptual, cognitive, and affective aspects of this ability.

That is, one

may ask, respectively, what another sees, knows, or feels, and perspective-taking tasks have been categorized according to these distinctions.
While such separations run counter to Piaget's concept of the child as
a structural whole (Chandler, 1977), a number of studies have attempted
to understand children's interpersonal behavi.or in terms of the ability
to assume the emotional perspectives of others.
Affective Perspective-Taking
Taking the affective perspective of another person involves mentally placing one's self in another's emotional situation, and must
necessarily include recognition of that person's emotional state.

Even

three year-olds may display this basic ability (Borke, 1971), and children as young as four or five show consensus in their expectancies with
regard to the affective outcomes ·of various experiences (Barden, Zelko,
Duncan,

&

Masters, 1980) ..

Borke (1971) asked subjects to identify drawings of four faces
whose expressions indicated happiness, ·sadness, anger, or fear.

Eight

stories were then told in which a child could be perceived as feeling
these emotions.

Each story was accompanied by a picture of a child

with a blank face, and the subject was asked to complete the picture
by selecting the face which best showed how the child in the story
felt.

Not only could children as young as three years of age identify
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pictures of faces as happy or sad, they could point to the correct faces
to accompany stories for which these emotions would be appropriate.
(Subjects were also asked why the story character felt the emotion
which had been specified, but results of this line of inquiry have not
yet been pub·lished.)

Borke concluded that detecting young children's

capacity -for empathic responses, that is, their understanding of what
others are feeling, requires an essentially non-verbal task, and that
her results called into question the notion that children are egocentric and unable to adopt the point of view of another person.
Berke's (1971) position was challenged on the grounds that affect
recognition, though necessary, is not sufficient as evidence against
egocentrism (Chandler & Greenspan, 1972).

Since even young children

tend to agree about emotional expressions and their situational ref erents, there is really no way·to determine in the ordinary course of
events whether another person's affective state has been perceived accurately.

In particular, one's own probable emotion in a comparable

situation, or the most likely response of people in general, may have
been attributed to the other person.

These latter responses have been

designated projective and normative judgments, respectively.

Only em-

pathic judgment, the accurate identification of the feelings of specific others, entails assuming another's emotional perspective.

Pro-

jecting one's own probable reaction onto another is considered an egocentric response.

And while not necessarily egocentric, a

norm~tive

judgment based upon knowledge of how most people would feel in a given
situation is generally not considered empathic (Shantz, 1975).

Thus,

it would seem impossible to distinguish empathic judgments from those
which are projective or normative except in situations where the emotion
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displayed is not what would ordinarily be expected in that situation.
Measuring Affective Perspective-Taking:

The Incongruent Items Paradigm

In one approach to the problem of identifying non-egocentric responses to others' emotions, children are shown drawings, photographs,
or video-taped episodes depicting a character whose facial expression
is at odds with the rest of the information given (Burns & Cavey, 1957;
Greenspan., Barenboim, & Chandler, 1976; Kurdek & Rodgon, 1975; Urberg

& Docherty, 1976; Iannotti, 1975a).

In one of Burns and Cavey's pic-

ture stories, for example, a child is shown smiling despite the approach
of a doctor wielding an oversized hypodermic syringe.

The subject is

thought to have assumed the target character's affective perspective if
the character's emotion is specified on the basis of the facial expression despite the pull of situational cues; reliance on situational cues
is considered projective or simply wrong.

(This-paradigm has also been

used to assess empathy as an affective response, with the subject's
professed affect considered empathic if it coincides with the facial
expression shown, rather than the situationally appropriate emotion
[Iannotti, 1978]).
Gove and Keating (1979) used a modified version of the incongruent items paradigm in which differing facial expressions dictated that
an event was objectively the same but subjectively different for each
of two characters (e.g., each receives a puppy, but one child is smiling while the other appears sad).

Gove and Keating saw situational

inferences, which would be considered projective in the studies described earlier, as indicating that for young children emotions are not
differentiated from the situations which elicit them; that is, feelings,
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actions, and context are all of a piece.

On the other hand, psycho-

logical (i.e., inference based on the characters' inner states) inference would require appreciation that people in a given situation do not
necessarily react in the same ways; recognition of the differing emotions was thought to show awareness that particular emotions are not
inextricably bound to certain situations.
Unfortunately, use of the incongruent items paradigm has yielded
no clear developmental insight regarding children's ability to make affective judgments.

While Burns and Gavey (1957) found that·five and

six year-olds were more.likely than children under five to use the facial expression in judging the target character's affect, in Kurdek and
Rodgon's (1975) kindergarten through sixth grade sample projection was
more prevalent at higher grade levels.

Iannotti (1975a) found no re-

lationship between age and naming the character's emotion on the basis
of either facial expression or situational information.

Greenspan et

al. (1976) presented first and third grade children with a brief videotaped sequence in which one adult male decisively beat another in an
arm-wrestling contest.

One version of the tape ended with the loser

looking and sounding appropriately sad; in. the incongruent version, he
appeared nonchalant and smiling while admitting his loss.

Nearly all

of the children from both grades who ·saw the incongruent videotape described the loser as having negative affect, although the older ones
indicating more uncertainty about their judgments.

However, when asked

to describe the character's facial expression, the older children correctly identified it as positive, while almost two-thirds of the
younger children incorrectly specified a negative emotion.

Gove and

Keating (1979) found that older children (mean age, 62 months) were
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better than younger ones (mean age, 46 months) at discriminating the
different emotions displayed by tw0 characters in the same situation,
as well as more likely to base their judgments on intrapersonal rather
than situational explanations.
Relating

Perspective~Taking

Measures to Prosocial Behavior

Given the preceding pattern of resuits, it is hardly surprising
that performance on affective perspective-taking tasks has not consistently been found to be related to prosocial behavior.

Strayer (1980)

found children's naturally-occurring helping, comforting, and giving
positive reinforcement "modestly" (p. 821), albeit not significantly,
related to their performance on two measures of perspective-taking (one
of which used the incongruent items paradigm).

Performance on these

measures was also unrelated to a measure of donations to a poor child.
Iannotti (1975a) found no relationship between the use of either facial or situational cues in judging a story character's emotion and
the number of candies children shared with an absent needy child.

On

the other hand, Buckley, Siegel, and Ness (1979) found a positive relationship between scores on a measure similar to that used by
(1971) and children's helping and sharing.

Bo~ke

Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow,

and Brady-Smith (1977) compared perspective-taking ability with measures
of helping, sharing, and comforting obtained from an earlier study
(Yar_row

&

Waxler, 19i6), and concluded that understanding of perspec-

tives did not pred·ict prosocial behavior.

However, Zahn-Waxler et al.

employed tasks which dealt specifically with questions of what other
people see and hear or what they might be expected to think or prefer
(e.g., the ability to choose an appropriate gift for an adult or an

r&
10

opposite sex peer); an affective perspective-taking task might have
been a more appropriate choice if indeed it is reasonable to expect
that accurate perception of others' feelings will enhance the probability of treating people well.

So far, evidence for this notion has

been equivocal where children are concerned.
The inconsistent findings with respect to the incongruent items
paradigm indicate several possible methodological and conceptual problems.

First, the few studies which have assessed the construct valid-

ity and internal consistency of affective perspective-taking measures
have not been encouraging (Ford, 1979; Kurdek, 1978; Rubin, 1978).

In

addition, a forced choice between facial expression and situational information in specifying another's emotion may indicate too narrow a
conceptualization of the

abi~ity

to undersnand others' emotions.

It

is at least necessary to determine what such a choice means for the
c~ild,

and to do this the reasoning process behind the response must be

considered.

Furthermore, the ability to integrate both expressive and

situational cues is unlikely to be related only to a decline in egocentrism, but may instead reflect improvement in the capacity for attending and processing information in general.

Children may fail at

perspective-taking tasks for reasons that have little to do with the
ability to escape one's own outlook and take another's point of view
(Borke, 1971; Ford,. 1979).

A task may be too complex, or the content

too unfamiliar for the child to understand; such failures are not
solely attributable to egocentrism as a limitation in cognitive structure, although they may be accommodated within Turiel's (1978) definition of perspective-taking as a way of obtaining information.
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Moreover, attempts to relate measures of perspective-taking to
prosocial hehavior encounter problems in selecting an appropriate criterion response.

Differences in the frequency and presentation of

events which invite prosocial responses, as well as in expected base
rates for various behaviors, undoubtedly contribute to inconsistent
findings.

Available normative data indicate that young children's

prosocial acts such as helping, sharing, and especially comforting are
relatively infrequent occurrences (Eisenberg-Berg & Lennon, 1980;
Murphy, 1937; Yarrow &.Waxler, 1976).

Consequently, if one wishes to

study such behaviors solely as they occur in natural settings, the
dross rate (i.e., the ratio of irrelevant material to useful information [Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 1966]) may be somewhat
high.

More importantly, since prosocial acts are most likely to occur

in response to events rendering another person in need, field observations may not fully take into account differences in opportunity
to engage in the target behaviors. Hence, comparisons of rates of occurrence per unit of observation across subjects or behavioral categories defy meaningful interpretation.

Strayer (1980), in reporting

I

prosocial and "empathic" behaviors as proportions of observed affect
displays to which subjects responded, has begun to deal with this
problem; her work represents an important
in this area.

corre~tive

to methodology

Differential opportunity to display particular behaviors

can also be controlled by presenting natural-appearing eliciting events
uniformly to all subjects (e.g., Buckley, Siegel, & Ness, 1979; Yarrow
& Waxler, 1976).

Such structured observations provide a useful and

reasonable adjunct to observations of naturally occurring behavior,
provided the simulation represents an adequate approximation of events

,-12
in a natural context.

SYMPATHETIC BEHAVIOR (COMFORTING)
Of the various prosocial behaviors which might be investigated
with regard to perspective-taking, sympathetic behavior (i.e., the offering of comfort or condolence to another person in distress) seems
particularly relevant.

Although the cognitive and emotional under-

pinnings of comforting behavior are not clear, some degree of understanding of another's predicament must precede intervention on the
other's behalf.

In order for a sympathetic response to be elicited,

the distress of another person must occur and be recognized, and the
respondent must not only have an appropriate course of action at his
or her disposal, but be motivated to produce it.

However, little is

known about children's understanding of other people's mishaps and what
might be done to alleviate

another's distress.

Children's attempts to comfort another person appear to be· rare,
but they do occur occasionally·

(e.g~,

Eisenberg-Berg & Lennon, 1980).

These responses, however, have seldom been s·tudied experimentally,

Yar-

row and Waxler (1976) carried out one of the most extensive investigations to date of the incidence of helping, sharing, and sympathetic
behavior (comfortin.g), in both naturally occurring situations and in
response to contrived opportunities in a laboratory setting.

In the

naturalistic investigation, each of 77 nursery school children was observed in four 10-minute samples of free play, and 87% of them exhibited at least one prosocial act.

Sharing and comforting (these

categories were combined because of low frequencies) occurred, on the
average, 2.1 times per child, and helping acts 6.2 times in each 40I

minute sample of behavior.

Laboratory measures of these behaviors were
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obtained from 108 children aged three to seven and a half, including
the nursery school children mentioned above.

The children were seen

individually in two 40-minute sessions, in which six situations inviting helping, sharing, and comforting responses were blended into
naturalistic social interaction with one or two f.emale adults.

In the

tests of sharing, the child was given food or a toy, while one of the
adults was deprived.

Opportunities to help involved picking up mater-

ials dropped by an adult.

In the two tests of comforting, both phy-

sical and emotional distress were

d~splayed.

In one, ·the experimenter

pinched her finger in a drawer, grimaced and held her hand, and then
went to run cold water on it.

On the other occasion, the child was

left alone briefly and another female adult reading in a distant part
of the room began to cry, supposedly over a sad story.

There was

"audible sniffling, trembling breathing, and soft sobbing" (p. 120)
lasting about one minute.

In all of these incidents a prosocial re-

sponse was scored if the subject intervened

~ctively

to give aid; 80%

of the children did so in at least one of the six situations.

Proso-

cial responses to at least one of the helping tasks were given by 52%
of the children, 33% responded prosocially to at least one of the
sharing tasks, and 37% to one or both opportunities to give comfort.
The problem of inconsistency in the presentation of eliciting
events makes Yarrow and Waxler's (1976) naturalistic data difficult to
interpret, since the· infrequency of comforting behavior may have been
due to a dearth of victims in need of consolation.

However, although

comforting and sharing were less common than helping in both the natural
and structured settings; quite a few children shared and offered comfort when given the opportunity to do so.

14

TRAINING CHILDREN IN SYMPATHETIC BEHAVIOR
The Use of Models

Although there have been many attempts to measure the empathic
capabilities of young children, few efforts have been made to train
children to behave sympathetically.

Recent investigations of prosocial

behavior have produced impressive evidence for the efficacy of modeling
procedures in promoting altruistic behavior in children, but most of
these studies have dealt with sharing, usually in the form of making an
anonymous donation to someone in need, and, to a lesser extent, with
rescuing, i.e., attempts to help another pe.rson in distress (Hoffman,
1976; Rushton, 1976).

In one of the few experiments attempting to in-

fluence comforting behavior, Yarrow, Scott, and Waxler (1973) found
that children who were exposed to both live and symbolic modeling by a
nurturant adult caregiver were most inclined to help and to verbalize
sympathy in real distress situations.

Symbolic modeling, such as man-

ipulation of characters in a diorama (a three-dimensional scene in
which objects or

figur~s

are placed in front of a background picture),

was highly effective in teaching children to response with sympathetic
verbalizations or manipulation of the symbolic material, but had little
effect on behavior toward real victims regardless of the nurturance or
non-nurturance of the model.

Staub, (197la) demonstrated that both

brief interaction with a nurturant adult who modeled helping and modeling alone increased kindergarten children's attempts to assist a supposedly distressed child, and that the combined effects of nurturance
and modeling were greater than those of either condition separately.
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There is still a considerable amount of uncertainty as to why behavior changes as a result of having observed a model, though modeling
has the obvious function of' transmitting new response patterns, and
the performance of either new or previously acquired behaviors may be
facilitated by observing response consequences to the model (Bandura,
1965, 1971).

Vicariously experienced reinforcement or punishment may

alter the observer's anticipation of the probable outcome should he or
she reproduce the model's behavior, which will in turn affect the probability of imitation (Mischel & Mischel, 1976).
gested (Bryan & London, 1970) that the

model~s

It has also been sugbehavior in an experi-

ment gives child subjects information about what acts are permissible,
indicates to the child what is expected of him or her, or if the child
is inhibited in the experimental situation, reduces inhibitions restraining prosocial acts.
There is convincing evidence that the apparent status and power
of a model relative to the observer affects the extent to which the
modeled behavior is imitated, with the behavior of high-status or powerful models more likely to be reproduced than that of models who lack
these characteristics (Bandura, 1971).

To the extent that children

perceive adults as having control over their actions or desired resources, one might expect them to imitate adult models more readily
than child models.

However, there is also evidence that similarity

between model and observer fosters imitation (Rosekrans, 1967), which
could lead to the opposite prediction.

Consideration of Bryan and

London's (1970) l·ine of reasoning suggests that a peer model should
convey more information regarding the permissibility and appropriateness of engaging in the modeled behavior.
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Induction
Bandura (1971) has noted that verbal instructions and descriptions of behavior may convey the essential features of a response or
delineate its consequences, as live modeling does, and that verbal
labeling of modeled responses may enhance the effects of observational
learning.

Hoffman (1970) also has pointed to the importance of verbal
;

elaboration of the effects of behavior in socialization processes.

The

term "induction" has been used to describe techniques in which explanations or reasons for changing one's behavior are given, or processes
which may activate conformity-inducing. tendencies within the child
(e.g., appeals to pride or concern for others).

Hoffman considers

"other-oriented" induction, which involves pointing out the harmful consequences of one's behavior toward others, calling attention to their
needs or desires, or explaining the other person's motives, to be especially important in generating internalized control of behavior.
Staub (1971b) investigated the ef.fects of role-playing and induction on kindergarten children's subsequent helping and sharing behavior.

He hypothesized that empathy would be engendered and the like-

lihood of prosocial responses increased if he not only pointed out
the negative emotions experienced by others, but stressed the positive
consequences for the victim when

~elp

is given.

This prediction was

not confirmed; compared with or. combined with role-playing, induction
did not affect helping or sharing with another child and decreased
children's inclination to help an adult.

Staub suggested that lack of

prior experience with the experimenter and the fact that she had no
further control over the child's behavior were in contrast to everyday
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practice, where both induction and parental control are ongoing processes.

Indeed, Hoffman (1970) cites evidence that parental discipline

of an inductive nature is associated with consideration for others and
internalization or moral standards.
SEX AND AGE DIFFERENCES
In the studies mentioned above, significant but inconsistent sex
differences have been found, though it has been suggested that where
quantitative differences appear, girls tend to show more prosocial responses than do boys (Rushton, 1976).

Hoffman (1977), reviewing sex

differences in various investigations of empathy and "related behaviors,"
cited 16 studies of empathy as shared affect; females obtained higher
scores in each.

While many of these differences were slight, he held

that the probability that al+ differences would have been in one direction by chance was slight also.

Sex differences in studies measuring

recognition of affect (e.g., Borke, 1971; Feshbach & Roe, 1968; Kurdek

& Rodgon, 1975), however, have not been found· consistently, nor are
they consistently obtained in measures of cognitive and spatial per.

,

spective taking.

Hoffman (1977) suggested that females "may have a

more highly developed affective base for prosocial behavior than do
males" (p. 720), but noted that both innate factors and socialization
practices may be implicated in sex differences in the expression of
empathy and related behaviors.

OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT STUDY
I

This study had several purposes.
promote comforting behavior in children.

First, an attempt was made to
Specifically, the influence
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of a peer model, and of modeling followed by an inductive statement, on
the performance of a sympathetic response was assessed.

Unlike most

previous studies, a child was used both as the sympathetic model and as

a victim

in need of comforting.

One group of children saw a six year-

old girl respond sympathetically to an adult's feigned injury.

Ase-

cond group saw the same injury and response, followed by an inductive
statement designed to provide information regarding the consequences of
the model's actions, i.e., reinforcement to the model and comfort to
the victim.

A third.group observed only the adult's injury.

All of

the children were then given the opportunity to themselves respond sympathetically to an apparent injury to the child model.

It was hypothe-

sized that the children who were exposed to both a sympathetic model
and verbal elaboration of the modeled behavior and its consequences
would be more inclined to exhibit similar behavior than those whose
training included modeling only, and that both groups would be superior
in this respect to children who had received no training.
Another purpose involved the attempt to relate children's ability
to recognize and understand the emotions of others and the capacity
for sympathy to actual sympathetic behavior in the live distress situation.

Accordingly, two measures of the children's ability to judge

another person's affective state were obtained and related to their
responses to the injured peer.

One measure (an affective perspective-

taking task) was patterned after Kurdek and Rodgon's (1975) adaptation of Borke's (1971) material; the other, a measure of children's
knowledge of appropriate strategies for intervening when another person
is in distress, was developed by the author for the present study.

It
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expected, on theoretical bases, that there would be a positive relationship between scores reflecting both the understanding of others'
emotions (affective perspective-taking) and knowing how to offer and/or
com.fort (intervention strategies) and comforting behavior, and that
performance on these measures would be better for older children than
for younger ones.

In view of the inconclusive results obtained pre-

viously with stimuli using incongruent facial and situational· cues to
others' emotions, no specific predictions were made regarding children's use of either source of information in making affective judgments.

No sex differences on any measure were anticipated.

CHAPTER II
METHOD
SETTING
This study was conducted at the Canterbury Learning Tree Day
School, in Tigard, Oregon.

The experimental setting consisted of a

small room in which a one-way vision observation booth had been installed; furnishings included a child's folding table and chairs, a
small trunk, and an assortment of objects provided to stimulate conversation.
SUBJECTS
Thirty~six

subjects.

boys and girls from the Canterbury School served as

These children were from a predominantly white, middle-class

population, with a large proportion of single-parent households.

Writ-

ten parental consent and willingness on the part of the child were
prerequisites for participation.
PROCEDURE
Children were randomly assigned to one of three treatment conditions.

The subject pool was divided at the median age into two groups,

33 to 51 months and 52 to 75 months of age.

Both sexes and the two

age groups were equally represented in each condition.

Four subjects

who became unavailable were each replaced by the same-sex child near-
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est in age.
Subjects were seen individually in three 20-minute sessions usually occurring within one week.

On each occasion, the first experi-

menter accompanied the subject to and from the experimental playroom
where, in the first and third sessions, the second experimenter and
child confederate were waiting.
the first experimenter alone.

The second session was conducted by
Although nurturance as such was not at

issue in this study, every effort was made to provide a uniformly
nurturant and naturalistic context at all times.

Table I provides an

overview of the three sessions and the measures obtained.
Session 1
Establishing rapport was the major concern in the fi.rst session.
Each subject was introduced to the child confederate and the second experimenter and engaged in conversation.

When the subject appeared to

be at ease, a guessing game was initiated.

To close the session, a

snack was served and the child was ·escorted back to. his or her classroom.
Session 2
For the second session, the subject was seated at the table facing the experimenter, who explained that she was interested in learning
about people's feelings.

Four white index cards, each displaying a

drawing of a child's face expressing happiness, sadness, anger, or fear
were placed on the table facing the child.

The child was asked to

identify these expressions, and incorrect responses were corrected.
If any one or more of the four responses were incorrect, the cards were
rearranged and the task was repeated until all of the expressions were
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TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF THE THREE SESSIONS AND MEASURES OBTAINED
Session I:

Building Rapport

Activities

Conversation, guessing games, snack

Personnel

Two experimenters, child confederate, one or two observers
Sessi.on II:

Task 1:

Cognitive Measures

Affective perspective-taking

Measures Obtained: Social comprehension, empathi~ judgment, projective judgment, explanat~on of affect,
awareness of discrepancy.
Task 2:

Knowledge of intervention strategies

Measures obtained: Social comprehension, intervention strategies
Personnel:

Fi.rst experimenter only
Session III:

Activities :

Experimental Situation

Conversation, Lotto game; feigned injury, snack

Control
Condi ti.on
Second experimenter,
child confederate
left room. First experimenter bumped
her head. Second experimenter, child
confederate returned,
game was resumed.

~ode ling
Condition·

Second experimenter
left room. First experimenter bumped her
head; child confederate modeled a comforting response. Second
experimenter returned,
game was resumed.

Modeling Plus
Induc ti.on Condi.tion
Second experimenter
left roo~. First experimenter bumped her
head, child. confederate modeled a comforting response. Second
experimenter returned,
discussion of incident, inductive statemend followed. Game
was resumed

Both experimenters left room to look for lost card. Child confederate
slaIIlllled trunk lid, feigning injury to her hand.
·
Measures obtained: Subject's response to child confederate's injury.
Subject's reporting of injury.
Personnel:

Two experimenters, child confederate, two observers.
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identified in one trial.

When this criterion had been met, a practice

item was presented to familiarize the child with the format of the ensuing tasks.

The cards were shuffled and placed in front of the sub-

ject before presentation of each item of both tasks:

the cards them-

selves provided a non-verbal response mode (pointing) for specifying
emotions, and. the sequence in which they were placed determined the
order in which the experimenter mentioned the emotions for each item.
(Pictures of the four faces may be found in Appendix A.)
Task 1 consisted of eight stories used by Borke (1971) and adapted by Kurdek and Rodgon (1975), illustrated by black and white cartoonstyle drawings of children whose facial expressions indicated happiness, sadness, anger, or f.ear.

Facial expressions were congruent with

the story in four of the items; in the remaining four items, the child
was pictured with an emotion considered inappropriate to the story
situation.

Expressions and stores were paired as in Kurdek and Rog-

don' s (1975) study:
sad.

Happy-afraid, sad-happy, afraid-angry, and angry-

However, in line with Berke's (1971) suggestion that the same

situation may produce differing negative emotions in different people,
sadness was included as an acceptable descri.ption of the emotion suggested by the story for the items contrasting happiness (facial cues)
with fear (narrative cues), and fear (facial cues) with anger (narrative cues).

Examples of a congruent item and an incongruent item are

presented in Figure l; the remaining Task 1 items are illustrated in
Appendix A.

For each item, subjects were asked to identify the

emotion of the main character and explain its occurrence.

Congruent

and incongruent items were alternated.; one of four permutations of the
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Congruent Item, GIFT
Here is a picture of John (Nancy).
He (she is getting a new toy for a
present.
How

does John (Nancy) feel now?

(Does he ($he) feel mad, or happy,
or sad, or afTaid·?)
Why do you think he (she) feels

--------

?

Incongruent Item, ICE CREAM
Here's John (Nancy) eating an ice
cream cone. It's his (her) very
most favorite kind of ice cream,
the kind he (she) likes best.
How does John (Nancy) feel now?
(Does he (she) feel afraid, or sad,
or mad, or happy?)
Why do you.think John (Nancy) feels

--------?
Figure 1: Sample congruent and incongruent items from Task 1.
(Note: Original figures were five to seven inches in height.)
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eight items, each beginning with a congruent item, was randomly assigned to each subject.
In the six Task 2 items, brightly colored individual

figur~s

were arranged in a flannel board to present two characters in affectarousing situations, with one character observing while the other experienced some form of mild distress.

For example, one item, shoWn

in Figure 2, illustrated the "crying lady" scenario used by Yarrow
and Waxler (1976), with a child identified as the subject playing with
blocks and a woman crying while reading a book; the remaining items,
with figures shown in typical arrangements, are illustrated in Appendix A.

Two of the scenarios served as introductory and filler items.

In the remaining four items, subjects were asked what they would do
upon witnessing such events.

If an appropriate course of action was

offered, this was incorporated into the story by the experimenter; if
not, the story continued with the observer making an offer of condolence to the victim, and the sad-faced characters of the original scene
were replaced by happier-appearing versions.

Subjects were asked to

identify the characters' emotions at both the beginning and the end of
each sequence.

One of four permutations of the six items, with the

filler items always occupying the first and fourth positions, was randomly assigned to each child.
For both tasks, each pictured child was shown with clothing and
hair style appropriate for either sex.

In Task 1, the main character

was described as being the same sex as the subject.

In Task 2, the

pictured child was identified either as the subject or as a friend or
sibling the subject was invited to specify.
were designed by the author.

All pictorial materials
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CRYING LADY

This is a story about you and
a grown-up lady. See, you are
sitting here playing with some
blocks, and the lady is reading a book. Suddenly the lady
starts to cry, and she cries
and cries.
How do you feel?
How does the lady feel?
What would you do if you saw a
grown-up lady cry like that?

Now, let's pretend that you go
ask the' lady what's the matter, and say something nice to
her.
·
How does she feel then?
How do you feel?

·Figure 2:

Sample item from_Task 2.
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Session 3
In the third session, the two experimenters, the child confederate, and the subject played a game called "Lotto."
manipulation oc.curred mid-way through the game.

The experimental

In the modeling con-

dition (N = 12) the second experimenter left the room.

While she was

gone, the first experimenter pretended to bump her head on an overhanging shelf and.the child confederate offered an appropriate sympathetic response.

Leaving her chair and approaching the experimenter,

she asked, "Are you all right?" and
hope it gets better soon."

added~

after a slight pause, "I

The experimenter replied that the child's

response had indeed made her feel better, giving her a quick hug.

When

the second experimenter returned, she asked if anything had happened
in her absence, giving the subject an opportunity to report the "injury."
Unless he or she did so, the first experimenter said that she had
bumped her head, but that it was "all right now," and the game was
resumed.

For the

·m~deling

plus induction group (N

= 12) the feigned

injury and the modeled response were the same as in the modeling condition, but the second experimenter expanded the report into a discussion
of the child confederate's sympathetic response, saying, "That was
really nice of you to make M__· feel better."

Turning to the subject,

she added; "I'll bet when people get hurt you like to make them feel
better, too---I thought so."

In the control condition (N

=

12), both

the second experimenter and the child confederate left the room; subjects saw only the first

experimen~er's

feigned injury.

For all subjects, upon finishing the Lotto game, it was discovered that a piece of the game was missing.

The two experimenters left
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the playroom to search for the lost card, asking the child confederate
to look for it in the room while they were gone.

The child confeder-

ate opened the trunk, found that the piece was not there, and pretended
to slam the trunk lid on her hand, verbalizing distress.

The experi-

menters waited ten seconds, or until the subject had finished responding, before entering the room.

Here, also, the subject was given an

opportunity to report the incident and, to conclude, a snack was served.
Session 2 was conducted without observers.

In sessions 1 and 3,

verbal and nonverbal behaviors were recorded as a running narrative
by one or two observers; with one exception, due to illness, two observers were present for session 3.
corded.

All three sessions were tape re-

Copies of the 'scripts for the trunk incident and the first

experimenter's feigned injury may be found in Appendix B.
SCORING
Table II presents a list of all·measures with the

der~vations

and

possible ranges of their scores.
Behavioral Measures
Responses to the child confederate's feigned injury were rated
independently by three female judges for evidence of sympathy, using
a 5-point scale.

(This scale, with examples of responses at each level,

is included in Appendix

C.)

Judges worked directly from session 3

tape recordings and copies of the two observers' narrative descriptions,
edited in each case to eliminate reference to the subject's sex and
to include only the time period when the two experimenters had left
the room and the trunk incident occurred.

A comforting behavior score
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TABLE II
LIST OF VARIABLES WITH DERIVATIONS AND POSSIBLE RANGES OF SCORES
Derivation of Score

Variable

Range

Affective Perspective-Taking (Task 1)
Social
Comprehension

Proportion of subject's responses
to the four congruent items correctly
specifying emotion

. 00 - 1. 00

Explanation
of Affect

Mean of judges' ratings of subject's
explanations of characters' emotions
for the congruent. items

1.0 - 4.0

Empathic
Judgment

Proportion of subject's responses to
three incongruent items in which affect was specified in accord with the
pictured facial expression

.00 - 1.00

Projective
Judgment

Proportion of subject's responses to
three incongruent items in which affect was specified in accord with
the narrative

. 00 - 1.00

Awareness of
Discrepancy

Mean of judges' ratings of subjects'
awareness of the discrepancy between
facial and narrative cues in the four
incongruent items

1.0 - 3.0

Knowledge of Intervention Strategies (Task 2)
Social
Comprehension

Proportion of subject's responses to
the six Task 2 items correctly specifying emotion
'

.oo -

Intervention
Strategies

Mean of judges' ratings for subject's
knowledge of strategies for sympathetic
intervention

1.0 - 5.0

1.00

Sympathetic Behavior
Comforting
Behavior

Mean of judges' ratings of sympathy evident in subject's responses to ch~ld
confederate's injury

1.0 - 5.0

Reporting

Rating of subject's effort to inform experimenters of child confederate's injury

.Q ;:- 2

Personal Characteristics of Subjects
Sex

Sex of subject (1

= female, 2 = male)

(Continued)

1 - 2
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TABLE II

(Cont'd.)

Derivation of Score

Variable
Age

Subject's age in months

Age Group

Older and younger children (1
months; 2 = 52-75 months)

Range
33 - 75

= 33-51

1 - 2

for each child was computed by averaging the three judges' ratings.
Children who spontaneously informed the returning adults of the trunk
mishap received a reporting score of 2; reports elicited by the experimenter's question received a score of 1.
Cognitive Measures
Task 1 congruent items were scored for social comprehension (1, O;
1 point for correct identification of the emotion depicted) and for
exElanation of affect (subject's ability to explain the emotion specified, rated on a scale of 1 to 4).

The incongruent items were scored

(1, O) for empathic judgment and projective judgment separately.

When

scored for empathic judgment, responses in which the emotion specified
by the subject matched the pictured facial expression were considered
correct; scored for projective judgment, correct responses were those
in which the emotion was specified on the basis of the situational (narrative) cues.

In addition, the incongruent items were rated for the

subject's awareness of discrepancy (ability to detect and reconcile the
conflicting facial and narrative cues, on a scale of 1 to 3).

Explana-

tion of affect and awareness of discrepancy were rated independentlY.
by two female judges, with differences resolved by consensus; scoring
criteria;' with examples of responses at each level, may be found in Appendix C.
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The six Task 2 items were scored for social comprehension (1, 0,
for identification of each of the two characters' emotion at the beginning of each episode and again after the proposed intervention;
scores for each item:were computed

a~

the proportion of the four emo-

tional expressions identified correctly).

For the four items in which

subjects were asked what they themselves would do in such situations,
responses were rated for knowledge of intervention strategies on a
5-point scale closely paralleling that used for rating sympathetic behaviors.

Scoring criteria and examples of responses are included in

Appendix C••
RELIABILITY
Agreement among the three judges' ratings of comforting behavior
was assessed by computing an intra-class correlation coefficient (Winer,
1971); reliability of a single judge was estimated at .94, and reliability of the mean for the three judges was .98.

Observer reliability

for this measure was not an issue, since judges used both observers'
narrative descriptions.

Reliability of the 'two judges' ratings of

explanation of affect, awareness of discrepancy, and knowledge of intervention strategies, as indicated by per cent agreement (agreements/
agreements + disagreements)

~as

95%, 92%, and 95%, respectively.

DAT.A'.. ANALYSIS
Behavioral Measures
Comforting behavior scores were subjected to a 3 x 2 x 2 factorial
analysis of variance (treatment x sex x age), with N

=3

children in
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each of the 12 cells.

A 3 x 2 x 2 factorial analysis of variance

(treatment x sex x age) was also conducted on the scores for reporting
the child confederate's injury, using unweighted means because of unequal cell frequencies (due to experimenter error, one child's score
was. not available) • ·
Item Analyses
Pearson product-moment correlati.on coefficients were computed for
items that were to be combined in forming each Task 1 and Task 2 composite measure; coeffi.cient alpha (Nunnally, 1978) was used to estimate
internal consistency reliability for each measure.

In order to exam-

ine item differences by sex and age levels, 2 x 2 x N analyses of variance (sex x age x items) with repeated measures on items were computed, followed where appropriate by post hoc comparisons among item
means (differences in i tern means were presumed to reflect differ.ences
in item difficulty).
Relationships Among Measures
Correlational tests (Pearson

-~)

were used to investigate relation-

ships among measures for the group as a whole and for boys and girls
separately.

Partial correlations, controlling for age, were obtained

for all pairs of the following Task 1 and Task 2 variables:
comprehension (for both tasks),

e~planation

Social

of affect, awareness of

discrepancy, and knowledge of intervention strategies.

'I
I

I
I

!

CHAPTER III
RESULTS
Results for the behavioral measures will be presented first, followed by results for Task 1 and Task 2.
measures will then be presented.

Intercorrelat'ions among all

Mean scores and standard deviations

for all variables (the two behavioral measures,the two social comprehension measures, explanation.of affect, empathic judgment, projective
judgment, awareness of discrepancy, intervention strateiges, and age
are listed in Table III.
BEHAVIORAL MEASURES
I
I

The results of the 3 x 2 x 2 analyses of variance (treatment x
sex x age) for the children's comforting behavior and for reporting
scores are presented in Appendix D.

No significant effects due to

treatment or to interactions involving treatment were obtained for
either measure; consequently, the groups were combined and both the
comforting behavior ratings and reporting scores were included in the
later correlational investigation of relationships among task components.

No significant age or sex differences were found for sympathetic

behavior.

Older children's scores for reporting the injury were higher

than those for younger children (F (1,23)

= 4.92, p < .05).

Since the

sex x age interaction for the reporting scores approached significance,
(F (1,23)

= 3.31, p = .08), directional t tests were used to assess the
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M
SD
Ma
SD
M
SD
M
SD
M
SD

Awareness of
Discrepancy

Task 2 Social
Comprehension

·Intervention
Strategies

Gomf orting
Behavior

Reporting

.
baMean proportions.
c N = 35.
d N = 17.
N = 8.

M
SD

- Ma
SD
Ma
SD

M
SD
Ma
SD

Explanation
of Affect

Task 1 Social
Comprehension

Projective
Judgment

Empathic
Judgment

Age in Months

• 77

2.58
1.37
.6ob

3.05
.95

.85
.21

1.34
.44

2.38
.79

.83
.. 22

.29
.32

.50
.79

2.59
1.39

3.22
.85

.84
.21

1.41
.37

2.38
.72

.81
.20

.11
.16

.76
.22

52.5
12.0

52.1
12.8
.58
• 35

Boys
N=18

All
Subjects
N=36

• 77

2.57
1.40
.7lc

2.88
1.05

.86
.22

1.28
.50

2.37
.87

.85
.24

.46
.35

.41
.37

51. 7
13.8

Girls
N=l8

.44
.73

2.93
1.31

2.97
.82

.73
.24

1. 22
.29

• 72

2.08

.20

• 72

.04
.11

.78
.24

42.0
5.3

Younger
Boys
N=9

2.26
1.47
.56
.88

.13d
.35

3.45
.85

.95
.08

1.69
.36

2. 69'
.62

.89
.18

.19
.18

.74
.22

63.0
5.6

Older
Boys
N=9

2.30
1.14

2.47
.95

.76
.28

1.04
.11

1.93
.57

.78
.23

.37
.31

.41
.36

40.1
5.9

Younger
Girls
N=9

.67

1. 22

2.85
1.63

3.28
1.03

.95
.06

1.52
.63

2.80
.92

.92
.25

.56
.37

.41
.40

63.3
8.1

Older
Girls
N=9

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR TASK 1, TASK 2, AND BEHAVIORAL MEASURES, AND AGE

TABLE III

~

w
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stability of the predicted age difference for each sex separately.

No

significant difference for older and younger boys was indicated, but
older girls' scores were higher than those for younger girls (.!:_ (15)

= 4.15,

p < .0005).

ITEM ANALYSES
Item intercorrelations, internal consistency reliability as estimated by coefficient alpha, and a summary of significant F values obtained in the repeated measures analyses of variance (sex x age x items)
may be found in Appendix E.
Task 1
Item intercorrelations for social comprehension were computed on
three of the four congruent items; since no child missed the item portraying happiness, correlation coefficients involving this item could
not be obtained.

Items were modestly intercorrelated (r = .15, p = .20

tor= .29, p < .05; coefficient alpha= .47).

A Task 1 social compre-

hension score for each child was computed as the proportion of the
congruent items identified correctly.

The repeated measures analysis

of variance indicated a significant difference among item means (F
(3,96) = 5.09, p < .01).

Newman-Keuls comparisons among item means

revealed that the mean score for the item portraying happiness was significantly higher than mean scores for the three remaining items.
Children's explanation of affect ratings for the congruent items
were moderately intercorrelated (.E, = .20, p = .12 to .E. = .50, p < .001;
coefficient alpha= .74), and each child's ratings across the four
items were averaged to yield a composite score.

Although the repeated
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measures analysis of variance indicated that there were significant
differences among item means on explanation of affect (F (3,96) =
2.85, p < .05).

Newman-Keuls procedures revealed no significant com-

parisons among pairs of item means.

However, .!_ tests for simple main

effects, using Dunn's procedure for keeping alpha constant for the set
of four comparisons (Kirk, 1968) revealed that a significant age ·x
items interaction (F (3,96) = 2.88, p < .OS) was due to older children's higher scores for the items portraying sadness (.!_ (32) = 3.62,
p < .01) and fear

(~

(32)· = 3.14, p < .05).

Upon inspection of item intercorrelations for the three measures
(empathic judgment, projective judgment, and awareness of discrepancy)
derived from the incongruent picture stories, one of the items proved
to be consistently unrelated to the three remaining incongruent items.
This item, contrasting fear with anger or sadness, was excluded from
composite scores for the three measures.
The empathic judgment scores for

th~

three incongruent items re-

tained were modestly intercorrelated (.£ = .14, p = .20 to r = .40,
p < .01; coefficient alpha= .53), as were those for projective judgment (r = .28, p < .06 to.!.= .51, p < .001; coefficient alpha= .67).
Composite scores for each child for the two measures were computed as
the proportion of items yielding empathic judgments and the proportion
yielding projective judgments.

Although no diffe'rences among item

means were found for either empathic or projective judgments, the repeated measures analysis of variance indicated significant sex x items
interactions for both measures (F (3,96) = 2.82, p < .05, and F (3,96)
= 5.49, p < .005, respectively);.!_ tests, using Dunn's procedure, wer.e
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used to investigate these interactions.

Boys' empathic

jud~ent

scores were higher than girls' scores for the item contrasting hAppiness (facial cues) with fear or sadness (narrative cues)
2.96, p < .05).

(~

(32) =

Girls' projective judgment scores were higher than

boys' scores for this same

item(~

(32) = 4.42, p < .01), and for the

item contrasting sadness (facial cues) and happiness (narrative cues)
(!_ (32)

= 3.45,

p < .01).

The awareness of discrepancy ratings for the three retained incongruent items ranged from E_ = .27 (p = .06) to.!.= .58 (p < .001);
coefficient alpha= .72.

Compos~te

scores were obtained by averaging

each child's ratings across the three items.

A highly significant

difference among item means (F (3,96) = 7.84, p < .001) was indicated
by the repeated measures analysis of variance.

As revealed by Newman-

Keuls comparisons, mean scores for the two items contrasting positive
and negative emotions (facial cues = happiness, narrative cues = fear
or sadness; facial cues = sadness, narrative cues = happiness) were
significantly higher than those for the two items contrasting only
negative emotions (facial cues

= fear, narrative cues = anger or sad-

ness; facial= cues= anger, narrative cues= sadness).
Task 2
The six Task 2 social comprehension items proved to be strongly
intercorrelated (.!_

=

.29 p < .05 to.!.= .91, p < .001; coefficient

alpha= .96), and each child's score for this measure was computed as
the proportion of correct answers for the six items.

The repeated

measures analysis of variance indicated no significant differences
among item means.

However, a significant age x items interaction
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emerged (F (5,160) = 4.39, p < .005); !_tests, using Dunn's procedure,
revealed that mean scores for older children were higher for the four
items comprising the intervention strategies measure, but not for the
two filler items.
Intercorrelations for the four intervention strategies items
were also high (r = .39, p < .01 to.!.= .60, p < .001; coefficient
alpha= .83).

Each child's. ratings across the four.items were aver-

aged to obtain composite scores for this measure.

A significant dif-

ference among item means was indicated by the repeated measures analysis of variance

(!

(3,96) = 3.25, p <

.05)~

Newman-Keuls compari-

sons showed.that only the highest and lowest item means differed significantly (child falling from wagon and child with broken leg, respectively).
Internal Consistency Reliability

I

For five of the seven Task 1 and Task 2 measures, explanation of
affect, projective judgment, awareness of discrepancy, Task 2 social
comprehension, and intervention strategies, internal consistency was
considered satisfactory or better for research purposes (coefficient
alpha= .67 to .96).

Alpha coefficients for the two remaining meas-

ures, Task 1 social comprehension and empathic judgment, were more
marginal (.47 and .53, respectively), and results obtained with these
measures should be interpreted cautiously.·
SEX AND AGE DIFFERENCES
The repeated measures analyses of variance revealed significant
main effects due to age for Task 1 social comprehension (F (1,32)

=

I
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4.76, p < .05), for explanation of affect (F (1,31) = 10.01, p < .005),
for awareness of discrepancy (F (1,32) = 13.0, p < .005), for Task 2
social comprehension (F (1,32) = 10.05, p < .005), and for intervention
strategies (F (1,32) = 4.47, p < .05).

In each case, older children

had higher mean scores than younger children.

Older and younger chil-

dren's mean scores for empathic judgment and projective judgment did
not differ, however, but girls' mean scores for projective judgment
were higher than those for boys (F (1;32) = 8.03, p < .01).
RELATIONSHIPS AMONG MEASURES
Results of correlational tests assessing relationships among
the Task 1 and Task 2 measures, the two behavioral measures, and age
are shown in Table IV.

While the large number of correlation coeffi-

cients computed suggests caution in interpreting these results, clear
patterns emerged.

For the group as a whole, social comprehension for

both tasks, explanation of affect, awareness of discrepancy, and intervention strategies were highly intercorrelated (.!_ = .43, p < .01
tor= .69, p < .001).

Since these variables were also strongly re-

lated to age, partial correlation coefficients, controlling for age,
were obtained.

As may· be seen in Table IV, these relationships gen-

erally remained quite strong (_;_ = .19, p .< .14 to .E. = .59, p < .001).
Children who made empathic judgments were somewhat more aware of the
discrepancy (r = .33, p < .05), but there were no further significant
relationships between either empathic or projective judgments and any
other measures.
boys.

Projective judgments were more common among olden

I

-.09

1. Age
• 3-1

3

-.05

.27

.37*

4

.66***
(.59***)

.13

.11

.53***

5

.65***
(.51***)

.43**
(.29*)

-.16

.33*

.53***

6

.43**
( .19)

.69***
(.57***

.53***
(. 42**)

.17

.07

.53***

7

.SO***
(.36*)

.53***
(. 40**)

.63***
(. 54***)

.59***
(. 52***)

-.02

.14

.10

.09

.10

.06

-.07

.06

-.09

.41**
.20

9

.28*

.33*

.39**

.19

.42**

. 34*

.14

-.07

.27

10

Behav. Meas.

s-

Task 2

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

Note: N = 36 except for Reporting, where N = 35. Two-tailed tests of significance for all correlations involving empathic judgment and projective judgment. Partial correlations, controlling
for age, are in p~rentheses.

10. Reporting

9. Sympathetic
Behavior

8. Intervention
Strategies

7. Task 2 Social
Comprehension

6. Awareness of
Discrepancy

5. Explanation
of Affect

4. Task 1 Social
Comprehension

3. Projective
Judgment

2. Empathic
Judgment

2

Measure

Task 1

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG ALL TASK 1 AND TASK 2 MEASURES, BEHAVIORAL MEASURES, AND AGE

TABLE IV

.i:-0
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No Task 1 or Task 2 measure predicted comforting behavior.

Al-

though comforting behavior was significantly correlated with reporting
the injury to the adults, the only other correlation involving comforting to approach significant suggested an inverse relationship with
age for boys (r = -.44, p < .10, two-tailed).

Reporting was related

to four of the five highly intercorrelated Task 1 and Task 2 measures
(Task 1 and Task 2 social comprehension,
p < .01; explanation of affect, .!..
strategies,
p < .01).

~

= .39, p

=

~

= .34, p

< .05 and ..E.

= .39,

.42, p < .01; and intervention

< .001) and, for girls only, to age (E..

= .67,

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
In this study, very young children clearly demonstrated that they
could distinguish between positive and negative emotions and, to a lesser extent, among the negative emotions of sadness, anger, and fear.
Further, the ability to recognize a specific emotion within its appropriate situational context (social comprehension) was shown by children
who were not yet three years old.

As one would expect, these capabili-

ties were more pronounced among the older children, as were the ability
to offer appropriate explanations for another person's feelings (explanation of affect), to recognize instances in which affect is inappropriate to the situation in which it occurs (awareness of discrepancy),
and to propose an appropriate course of action when another person is
in distress (knowledge of intervention strategies).
tialled out, these measures appear

t~

Even with age par-

have a great deal in common, and

may be tapping a fairly broad category of social cognition.

They are

also related, no doubt, to overall cognitive development and verbal
skills.

But attempting to distinguish between empathic and projective

judgments on the basis of a child's attention to facial expressions
rather than situational cues does not fit into this picture, since the
tendency to make empathic judgments was related to only one of the other
measures, and projective judgments to none.

Moreover, empathic judg-

ments were not correlated with age for either sex, while projective
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judgments were actually
ones.

~

prevalent in older boys than in younger

Girls made a greater number of projective judgments than boys,

but the sexes did not differ on any other measure.
Neither observing another child respond sympathetically to an
adult's feigned injury by offering condolence, nor hearing an adult
label and approve the modeled response, was effective in promoting sympatheti.c behavior when the child model herself ·appeared to be injured.
Still, with the experimental groups. combined, 28% of the children attempted to comfort the injured child (i.e., responded at point four
or five on the behavioral rating scale), and 42% reported the mishap
to the experimenters (17% did so spontaneous.ly).

Neither age nor sex

influenced the probability of a comforting response.

No part of the

affective perspective-taking measure predi.cted comforting, nor were
children who suggested an appropriate intervention strategy in response
to a

sto~y

character more likely to of fer comfort in the live distress

situation than thos.e who did not.

However, children who reported the

injury were more likely to have offered comfort, and reporting was related to the ability to recognize and explain situationally consistent
emotions and to propose a sympathetic respons.e to the story character's
distress..
The percentage of children who responded ·sympatheti.cally, although
lower than 'that ohtained by Yarrow and Waxler (1976) under similarly
l

I.
!

structured observation, was considerably higher than the frequency of

i

such behavior reported under field observation would suggest (cf. Yarrow

I

& Waxler, 1976; Eisenberg-Berg & Lennon, 1980).

I

We simply do not know,

however, what proportion of sympathy-inviting mishaps in the real world
actually elicit attempts to comfort the victim, and well-executed lab-
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oratory analogs. of naturally-occurring events may provide a more accurate estimate of children's propensities for sympathy than can be obtained by merely tallying instances of comforting as they happen to
occur.

In this study, the child confederate's feigned injury was ex-

tremely realistic and consistent, and occurred in a very believable
way; there was no evidence that any child saw the trunk incident as
other than a natural happening.

Further, demand characteristics of the

experimental s.ituation were minimized by having no adults present when
the injury took place.

~hus,

it is plausible that naturally-occurring

sympathetic behavior was sampled.

Clearly, s.ome very young children

can and will attempt to comfort another child, but the antecedents of
such behavior remain unclear.
Even though the experimental technique of modeling and induction
us.ed here did not influence the children's comforting behavior, it is
highly improbable that the kinds of instructions and behavioral examples
provided by socializing agents in everyday life, which. this study attempted to s.imulate, are unrelated to children's inclinations to respond
sympathetically.

It is. likely,

ho~ever,

that promoting sympathetic re-

sponses requires more prolonged exposure to training as part of the ongoing socialization process, and perhaps stronger methods than were used
here.

Indeed Zahn-Waxler, ·Radke-Yarrow, and King (1979) found that

mothers' use of inductive statements when their children have caused
another person's distress is related to the children's offering of aid
and comfort even when they themselves have not caused the harm, but that
mothers whose children were most inclined to be altruistic were forceful, emotional, and sometimes harsh in delivering the message.

The
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modeling and inductive techniques which can be used ethically and practically in an experimental setting may simply be insufficient to the
task of inducing the desired behavior.
One must conclude that· individual differences in the children and
thei~

backgrounds, to which the cognitive measures apparently were not

sensitive, accounted for the variability in these children's sympathetic
responding.

However, differences in the extent to which demand charac-

teristics affected responses to the cognitive and behavioral tasks may
have lessened the chance of finding a positive relationship between the
two kinds of measures,since the scores on the cognitive tasks were more
likely to have been influenced by a desire to please the experimenter
or to perform well.

One child followed two responses in which she pro-

posed helpful intervention strategies with, "I'm doin' good!"

Such

motivation may have been present in other children without finding overt
expression, but was les.s likely in the live distress situation where,
as noted previously, no adult was present.

Indeed, comforting behavior

toward the injured child may have been inhibited by fear on the part of
the subject that opening the trunk was not permis.sible--one child who
pulled several things out of the trunk and played with. them suddenly
said, "Don't tell, okay?

I don't like people who tell."

It may be,

also, that children whose verbal skills were s.ufficient for a response
to the injured children confederate such as "Okay, it's okay, B

"

lacked the. ability to verbalize an explanation or sympathetic course of
action in response to a. direct question.

In addition, it is likely

that detecting whatever relationship between children's understanding
of others' emotional expressions and needs might exist calls for more
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than one situational test of the child's behavior ..

As 9reen (1978) and

Epstein (1979) have pointed out, demonstrating stable tendencies to act
in particular ways.usually requires the aggregation of behavioral measures across a number of situations.

In all, the possibility that cog-

nitive measures such as those used here might ultimately prove useful
in predicting sympathetic behavior has not been ruled out.
Of the cognitive tasks used in this study, four of the five strongly
intercorrelated measures (explanation of affect, awareness of discrepancy, knowledge of intervention strategies, and the two measures of
social comprehension) show that it is quite possible to develop items
and construct scales with adequate internal consistency reliability,
and all five indicate sufficient convergent validity to warrant their
use for investigating issues involving social cognition in children.
Whether or not they measure something other than general cognitive development and verbal skills remains to be determined (see Campbell &
Fiske, 1959, for a discussion of convergent and discriminant validation),
but the stability of the correlations with age partialled out suggests
a dimension of social sensitivity or competence which may vary somewhat
independently of overall intellectual functioning.

Perhaps a certain

level of intelligence or achievement of a particular stage of cognitive
development is necessary but not sufficient to explain performance on
tasks such as these which, on the face of it, appear to assess children's understandin·g of other people's emotions and their situational
referents, and knowledge of appropriate reactions to others' needs.
However, the two remaining measures (empathic and projective judgment)
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do not appear to be related to this more general understanding of emotional events.
Whether perspective-taking is considered an aspect of cognitive
structures, as within a traditiorlal Piagetian frame of reference, or
a way of gathering information, as.Turiel (1978) suggests, one would
expect older children to be more successful
particular perspective-taking task.

tha~

younger ones on any

Thus, if the faculty for assessing

other people's emotional states non-egocentrically is really indicated
by predicting their feelings on the basis of expressive cues when these
are at odds with the situation in which they occur, empathic judgment
scores should have been higher for the older children.

By the same

reasoning, any evidence that projective responses increase among older
children defies ready explanation; yet older boys in this study tended
to give a greater number of projective judgments than did younger boys.
These results are similar to those of Kurdek and Rodgon (1975), who ·:
found that projective responses increased steadily with advancing grade
level for children of both. sexes in their kindergarten through sixth
grade sample.

Together, the two studies suggest that projective re-

sponses become more prevalent as children progress through the age
ranges of the Piagetian preoperational and concrete operational periods
of cognitive development.

This should not happen if the task correctly

indexes. a developmental trend away from egocentrism.
The overall sex difference in empathic and projective judgments,
which replicated Kurdek and Rodgon's (1975) results, are not, as they
also noted, easily interpreted; no clearly satisfactory reason for girls
to make more projective judgments comes readily to mind.

Discussing
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Kurdek and Rodgon's findings, Hoffman (1977) proposed that the particular situational cues used might have been more salient for girls, a
plausible suggestion in light of the item analyses performed for this
study.

Since the sex difference did not hold for all items, it may

thus be specific to certain situations and might in fact not represent
a stable tendency for girls to respond more strongly to situational information.
The specification of a particular emotion when facial and situational cues are pitted against each other is not, in

i~olation,

an ade-

quate test of the child's ability to assume the emotional perspective
of another person; the reasoning behind the choice must be taken into
account.

On the bas.is of empathic judgments alone, one cannot argue

that perspective-taking has occurred.

Some children who correctly named

the pictured emotion did so without indicating any understanding .of the
situation.

Their responses suggested that attention was focused solely

or primarily on the facial cues, and thus provided evidence only for
recognition of the expression.
cial and situational cues.

Other children took notice of both fa-

Fbr example, some who recognized the sad

expression on the face of the child with the ice cream cone asked, "Why
is he sad?" or "Then how come he's crying?"

These responses indicate

that the feelings. of the child in the picture were unexpected, since·
items in which face and story were congruent provoked no such questions.
This level of awareness of the conflicting cues suggests some ability
to decenter (i.e., to consider more than one aspect of a situation at
a time) and recognize a perspective differing from one's own.

Still

other children not only detected the discrepancy but offered explana-
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ti.ons by whi.ch it could be reconciled.

In response to the picture of a

smiling child dreaming of being chased by a ferocious tiger, one girl
said the child was happy "'cause she can run faster than the tiger!"
This type of response was obtained from children as young as four and
a half years, and shows that preschool children can, at least in some
situations, recognize and offer a reasonable explanation for an emotional perspective that differs from their own.

It is their awareness

of and attempts to deal with discrepant information which allow the ass.ertion that perspective-taking can be demonstrated by children of this
age.
Together with the item

analyses~

children's awareness of the dis-

crepancy between facial and situational cues helps to clarify a point
or tw.o with. regard to the internal consistency of measures using incongruent items.

As Borke (1971) pointed out, the same situation may,

for example, produce anger in one person and sadness in another; thus,
an item contrasting these two negative emotions may not seem incongruent
at all.

Here, the two items where expression and situation were both

negative elicited si.gnif icantly less awareness of the discrepancy than
did the £tems contrasting a negative emotion with happiness, raising
the possibility that for the child these supposedly incongruent items
did not differ 'from those in which face and story together represented
only one emotion.

In this case, such incongruent items would be no

more capable than congruent items of detecting a projective response.
In addition, since for empathic judgment, projective judgment, and awareness of discrepancy one item was unrelated to the other three, and since
intercorrelations of the three remaining items were somewhat marginal
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for empathic judgment, it may well be that the emotions themselves vary
in salience for different children or across different situations.

Such

sources of variability across items would adversely affect item intercorrelations, and call into question the use of composite scores .for
such. measures without reporting internal consistency reliability--a
practice w:hiah is., unfortunately, not uncommon (e.g., Kurdek & R0dgon,
1975; Urberg & Docherty, 1976; Burns & Brainerd, 1979).
In addition to the question of age-relatedness in empathic and
projective judgments, empathic judgment scores should, logically, have
been related to the other cognitive measures if they do indeed represent the more cognitively mature response.

Yet except for awareness of

the discrepancy between facial and situational cues, this was not the
case.

While it is perhaps not surprising that the tendency to make em-

pathic judgments was correlated with awareness of the discrepancy, this
relationship cannot be interpreted confidently.

Examination of the

children's. res.ponses. suggests that the dis.crepant facial expression
could more r·eadily be reconciled to a· correctly specified facial expression than the other way around.

For example, a six year-old who

claimed that the crying child with an ice cream cone was happy said,
"I \olonder why s.he' s crying • • . because if it's her favorite kind she'd
probably be happy."

In contrast, another six year-old thought the same

character was s.ad "Because she might be eating it too fast and then she
gets a headache."

Since making empathic judgments was not related to

higher-level responses to the other cognitive measures, it is not clear
whether this one significant correlation represents a real relationship
or a lack of independence·between the two measures.

An adequate recon-
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ciliation of the discrepant cues may virtually entail specifying the
facial expression as the emotion felt.
Even if the methodological questions raised here were to be resolved, the use of facial expressions rather than situational information as the standard for non-egocentric judgment poses conceptual problems.

Piaget has asserted that non-egocentric assessment of another's

point of view requires. the construction of alternative perspectives by
inference rather than by direct perception (Piaget & Inhelder, 1948/
1956; 1962).

Thus, the incongruent items paradigm seems to entail a

contradiction, s.ince making an inference about other people's feelings
on any basis other than situational information requires direct perception of their expressive cues.

Further, as noted previously, a sit-

uationally based judgment is not necessarily egocentric, even though
the pers.pective of a particular person has not been assumed.
of how most people would feel in a given situation

(~.e.,

A judgment

normative

judgment [Shantz,. 1975]) would not constitute entrapment within one's
own point of view. but cannot be distinguished in the incongruent-items
paradigm from the projection of one's own feelings onto another.

This

paradigm simply cannot be defended as an index of non-egocentric responding on the basis of the choice of emotions alone.
In all, the results reported here are in accord with other research
on egocentrism and/or perspective-taking, which to date does not support the notion that development qf some one cognitive structure or
unitary ability leads to being able to take another person's point of
view (Kurdek & Rodgon, 1975; Urberg & Docherty, 1976; Rubin, 1978;
Ford, 1979).

While these findings are based upon the mobility to demon-

strate consistent relationships among perspective-taking measures, it
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is s.ometimes not possible to classify even an individual response as
unequivocally egocentric--or not.

For example, while it may seem that

the youngster who chooses a toy as a birthday gift for his or her
mother presents. a classic example of childlike egocentrism with regard
to inferring preference (cf. Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, & Brady-Smith,

1977), such a task does not measure the ability to judge another person's emotion in a particular situation.

In the present study, a boy

who clearly recognized that the Task 2 crying lady was sad said he
would "let her play with the blocks" which were in the possession of
the child in the picture.

The lady might not have cared much for

blocks., though she could well have been pleased by the of fer, but her
preference is not the only issue.

From the fact that the lady was

crying, this child inferred that she was sad and apparently
that s.omething might 'be done to brighten her outlook.
assessed her feelings, if not her taste.

und~rstood

He correctly

While it could be argued that

this boy's suggestion was projective or normative in that he proposed
an act which. he or any other child might appreciate, where can any of
us look for information on how to respond to ano·ther' s plight except
to our own experience or what we know of others?

It would perhaps make

more sense to view egocentrism as a persistent cognitive bias than as
a parti.cular aspect of cognitive structure that one either has or does
not have, or to view perspective taking as an information gathering
technique, as Turiel (1978) has recommended.

As Flavell (1977) has

pointed out, we are at risk for egocentric thinking all our lives, and
the possibility that one's perception of others' needs and feelings is
distorted inevitably persists. We need both a broader conceptualization
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of perspective-taking as a multidimensionai skill and a clearer view of
what it means. to take another's point of view.
The problem of establishing an acceptable criterion for determining whether or when children are able to discern the emotional perspectives of others has not been resolved..

Certainly more attention must

be given to methodological issues; in particular, internal consistency
reliability must be established before items are combined to form
scales.

Differences in stimulus materials need to be explored system-

atically if the homogeneous items needed for reliable scales are to be
developed.

More specifically, the use of the incongruent item paradigm

as a measure of affective perspective-taking is of little value unless
the task is' structured so that the choices themselves have clear implications (e.g., Gove & Keating, 1979), or children's explanations of
their judgments are probed, as in the awareness of
in this study.

~iscrepancy

measure

Despite the shortcomings of this paradigm as it is cur-

rently used, however, incongruent stimulus materials might be used productively to explore the relative contributions of expressive and situational information to children's perception and understanding of others'
emotions.
In a more encouraging vein, the intervention strategies task designed for this study evinced no particular psychometric problems, and

.

did indeed provide irisight into children's knowledge of what to do when
faced with another person's distress.

It also provided some interesting

comparisons with comforting behavior in the live distress situation.
For example, a number of children suggested actions which would help,
ra~her

than console, the picture-story victim ("I would go help--I would
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pick the wagon up for him."), and some indicated that they would report
the event to an adult.

Although the need for direct assistance was

not evident when the child confederate appeared to be injured, several
children spontaneous.ly told t:he returning adults of the mishap.

Such

reporting may well be construed by the child· as a way of helping, and
was related to the knowledge of intervention strategies as well as to
social comprehension, explanation of af feet, and comfortin·g behavior.
It is interesting that in the measure of intervention strategies the
.three children under five years.of age who said they would seek adult
help offered to get or tell their own parents, while those five and
over would contact the victim's parents ("If they told me where they
live, I would go to their

house~')!.

Inquiries regarding the other per-

son's condition ("Are you okay?" "I would just say, 'are you all
right?'") were common to both conditions, as were statements of reassurance ("It's okay." "I would say, 'Hey! It's gonna be okay, man'.").
Common to both measures also were warnings or admonitions ("You have
to watch out!" "He pick those apples--he be careful, he be careful!").
The stories involving injury frequently triggered associations with
the child's own painful experiences ("I hur.t my back • . . I show you
my hurt." "I got a sore now."), a type of response not unusual even
in adults.

Such associations were not expressed in the live distress

situation, although experience with pilot subjects had indicated that
they could be expected.
The examples of children's ability to state appropriate intervention strategies show that some young children do indeed have such
knowledge.

In addition, they indicate the possibilities inherent in
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this measure for allowing children to demonstrate what understanding
they have.

Since information concerning children's knowledge and at-

ti.tudes with. res.pect to situations which invite offers of help or condolence is scarce and largely anecdotal, this format offers a promising
avenue for further exploration.
This study suggests that children begin to recognize and understand others' emotions at a very early age, whether or not they differentiate feelings from their contextual determinants (cf. Gove &
Keating, 1979).

But throughout life situati.onal information is bound

to interact with the perception of emotional cues.

Children may learn

to rely on normative judgments, which would reduce the amount of information required to process each person/ situation interaction. and,'. in .
addition, must eventually come to realize that people do not always
express their emotions v.iridically.

Further, observers and actors alike

may have been taught to suppress the expression of their own feelings,
and to refrain from commenting on the affective displays of others.
And, of course, sooner or later a child learns to make inferences about
the emotions of others who are absent, from descriptions of their plight
alone.

Although children as they get older do become increasingly able

to infer the
that

t~ey

in~er

states of others (Flapan, 1968), it is most likely

do not learn to downgrade the context of emotion so much as

to integJ;ate s.ituational and expressive cues.

Which source of infor-

mation dominates the child's perception of emotion at any one time may
vary with the relative strength

~f

the two sets of cues, which emotion

is involved, and the nature of the situation.
Finally, the.relationship between assuming another person's emo-
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tional perspective, or knowing how to offer consolation, and behavior
toward others is not simple or straightforward.

There is no necessary

connection between comprehension of another's feelings and treating
that person well; such knowledge may not be acted on at all or may even
be used to one's own advantage at another's expense.

Thus, the inves-

tigation of cognitive influences on prosocial behavior calls for some
concern for the motivation behind whatever uses to which knowledge and
understanding are put.

Further, one's own emotional responsiveness may

color judgments about emotions perceived in others just as cognitive
processes come into play when we interpret our own or others' affect.
Zajonc (1980) has characterized affect and cogni.tion as partially independent systems which can interact in many

~ays,

varying somewhat

independently as they affect the processing of information.

Viewed in

this light, we are really facing the effects of a very complicated set
of interactions.

While measures such as those used here· must often deal

with abilities and events more or less in isolation, we would do well
to bear in mind that the interrelationship of cogni.tion, emotion, and
behavior is rich and complex, and to interpret the evidence we garner
against the background of this intricate and fascinating interaction.
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TASK l ITEMS

Congruent Items

GOOD-BYE
I think this lady is John's (Nancy's) grandma. John (Nancy) likes
his (her) grandma a lot, but now grandma has to go away and she won't
be back for a long time.
How does John (Nancy) feel when his (her) grandma goes away?
(Does he (she) feel afraid or happy or sad or mad?)
j·

Why does he (she) feel

?

l

(Continued)

65

DARK

Look at this pi.cture of John (Nancy). It's nighttime, and he (she)
is all by hims·elf (herself) in the dark. It's really dark!
How does John (Nancy) feel?
(Does he (she) feel happy or sad or afraid or mad?)

Why does John (Nancy) Feel

?

(Continued)

66

FOOD
Here is John (Nancy) eating breakfast. He (she) doesn't like what's
in his (her). dish at all, but his· (her) mother says he (she) has to
eat it all up anyway.
How does John (Nancy) feel now?
(Does he (s.he} feel sad or afraid or happy or mad?)
Why do you think he (she).feels

(Continued)

?

67

Incongruent Items

,. . ._~- ·' ~ ~·- *
-1~ ~

():)

TIGER
Look at John (Nancy) in this picture. See, he (she) is asleep, and
he (she) is dreaming that a big, mean tiger is chasing him (her).
How does John (Nancy) feel now?
(Does he (she) feel happy, or mad, or afraid, or sad?)
Why does John (Nancy) feel

?

(Continued)

68

BALL
.John (~ancy) and his (her) friend were playing with his (her) new
red ball. They were having a lot of fun, but then John's (Nancy's)
brother· (sister) grabbed the ball and ran away with it.
How does John (Nancy) feel then?
(Does he (she) feel sad, or afraid, or mad, or happy?)
Why do you think John (Nancy) feels

(Continued)

?

69

FALL
Oh, look! John (Nancy) fell down. He (she) was running really fast,
and he (she) fell down and hurt himself (herself).
How does John (Nancy) feel?
(Does he (she) feel happy, or mad, or sad, or afraid?)
Why does John (Nancy) feel

?
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TASK 2 ITEMS

BROKEN LEG
Here you are and here's your
friend
.
was riding his
(her) bicycle one day and he
(she) fell off and broke his
(her) leg. It hurts a lot, and
now~- can't go outside and
play. You want ~ to come out
and play with you.
How does

feel?

How do you feel?
What would you do if you went
to your friend's house and he
(she) had a broken leg and
couldn't play?
Then you s~y, "Don't feel bad.
I'll stay for a while and we
can play in here. Pretty soon
you will feel better."
How does

feel then?

How do you feel?

(Continued)
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APPLE TREE

This is a story about a man and a boy
(girl) who went out to pick some apples. They had a ladder, and a bucket
to put the apples in, but the ladder
slipped and the man fell down and hurt
his leg.
How does the man feel?
How does the boy (girl) feel?
What· would the boy (girl) do if he
(she) saw someone fall like that?

The boy (girl) goes over to the man and ·
asks if he is all right, and he (she)
says, "I hope it doesn't hurt very
much."
How does the man feel then?
How does the boy

(Continued)

(~irl)

feel?

72

WAGON
Look, here is a picture of you.
You were zooming down the hill
in a wagon, but the wagon tipped
over and you fell out and
skinned your knee. It really
hurts! Your friend
is
standing there and s-;es you get
hurt.
How do you feel if this happens
to you?
How does your friend feel?
What would you do if you saw
someone get hurt like that?
Then
says, "Does it hurt? It
will feel better pretty soon."
How do you feel then?
How does your friend feel?

(Continued)
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PICNIC
Let's pretend this is a picture
of you. You are at your friend's
house, and his (her) mom is
getting reach for a picnic,
putting good things to eat into
a basket. ~- is getting some
toys to play with. You are
wishing you could go too, instead of staying home alone.
How do you feel?
How does your friend feel?
Then your friend's mom says,
"Why don't you go ask your
mother if you can come too?"
So you run home and ask, and
your mom says you may.
How do you feel then?
How does your friend feel?

(Continued)
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BEACH
Here you are at the beach. But
you and your brother (sister) have
to stay in the cabin because it's
raining. Your brother (sister)
has a book to look at, but you.
don't have anything to play with.
How do you feel?
How does your brother
feel?

(~ister)

Then the sun comes out, and it
turns into a nice day. So you and
your brother (sister) put on your
swimsuits and run out to play on
the beach.
You do you feel then?
How does your brother
feel?

(~ister)

APPENDIX B
SCRIPTS FOR THE THREE

~XPERIMENTAL

CONDITIONS

No-Model (Control) Condition
(Second experimenter and child confederate leave room)
1st Exp: I need a Kleenex •.. where did I put that box of Kleenex?
(Stands, bumps head on shelf.) Oh! Ouch! I bumped my head.
(Sits down.) That hurt!
(Pause;

~nd

exp. and child conf. re-enter)

2nd Exp: Sorry we took so long •.. Did anything happen while we were
gone? (Pause for subject to respond. If no response:)
1st Exp: Well, I bumped my head, but it's all right now.
2nd Exp: Oh.

(Game resumes)

Modeling Condition
(Second experimenter leaves room.

Same injury and need verbalization.)

Child C: (Stands, goes to 1st Exp.) Are you all right?
gets better soon. (Continue as before)

I hope it

Modeling Plus Induction Condition
(Second experimenter leaves room.
and modeled response as before)

Same injury, need verbalization,

2nd Exp: Sorry I took so long ..• Did anything happen while I was gone?
1st

~xp:

2nd Exp:

Well, I bumped my head, but B
B~-

made you feel better?

made me feel better.

How did she do that?

1st Exp: She came over and asked if I was all right.
2nd Exp: Wow, B
, that was really nice of you to make M
feel better. (To subject) I'll bet when you see somebody get hurt,
you like to make them feel better too •.. I thought so.
Test of Sympathetic Behavior
;

!·

(Finish game, piece is missing)
1st Exp: Hey, wait a minute ... Part of the game is missing!
(Continued)
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APPENDIX B

(CONT'D.)

2nd Exp: Oh dear ••• It's no fun to play a game when part of it's lost •••
We'd better find it! I know, maybe I dropped it in the hall.
M , why don't you and I look in the hall, and B
, you

look around the room while we're gone.

(Experimenters leave

room.)
Child C: Maybe it's in the trunk. (Goes to trunk, lifts lid.) No,
it's not here. (Pretends to slam trunk on hand.) Oh •.• I
slammed my hand in the trunk, and it really hurts! (Pause,
experimenters return, chance to report.)
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SCORING SYSTEM FOR SYMPATHETIC BEHAVIOR
Score

Category

Example of Response

1

Essentially no response. No
evidence of concern or sympathy. May notice trunk slam
but directs attention elsewhere. No acknowledgement
of injury or possibility of
injury.

2

Child attends to the incident,
verbally or non-verbally. May
show evidence of subjective
discomfort, must at least
interest or intense awareness.
May include a non-sympathetic
response.

Subject looked at child confederate, glanced at trunk,
stared at child confederate,
moved back toward chair,
still watching her.

3

A verbal response acknowledging injury; may include association with child's own experience.

Subject looked at child confederate, said "Where'd it
smash your hand?"

4

Verbal acknowledgement of injury, with remedy or admonition.

Subject moved toward child
confederate, saying "You have
to watch out, 'cause it hurts,
it hurts."

5

Verbal or physical of fer of
condolence, inquiry regarding
the other's condition using
such words as better, hurt,
OK, all right, directed to
the injured child.

Subject looked at child confederate, reached toward her,
asked "Are you OK?" Subject
approached child confederate,
saying "OK, it's OK, B
---·
we'll just pack it up." Subjeck bent over to look at
child confederate.
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SCORING SYSTEM FOR EXPLANATION OF AFFECT AND
·AWARENESS OF DISCREPANCY
Explanation of Affect
Criteria

Example

1

No response, irrelevant response, or response missing.

"I don't know."

2

A response consistent with a~
emotion specified incorrectly.

"Sad--because he might get
lost" (DARK)

An unrealistic or fanciful response.

"If he walk in the dark he
get scared--might be a
cookie monster or a tiger"
(DARK)

3

A response realistically consistent with the emotion correctly specified and all information given.

"Because he has a present-a new toy" (GIFT)

4

An inference going beyond the
information given.

"Because she loves her
grandma and she doesn't
want her to go away" (GOODBYE)

Score

Awareness of Discrepancy
1

No response, irrelevant response, or response missing.

"I don't know," "And the
bed?" (TIGER)

2

Response showing awareness of
the discrepancy between facial
and story cues.

"I think she's happy again;
I wonder why she's crying-because if it's her favorite
king she'd probably be hap-

py" (ICE CREAM)

3

Attempt to explain discrepancy
contradicts information given

"'Cause his mom got him the
wrong king, that he didn't
want" (ICE CREAM)

Attempt to explain discrepancy
focus on and can reconcile
both facial and story cues

"Because the tiger's running
after him and then he gets
more running power."
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SCORING SYSTEM FOR INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

Question:

What would you do if you saw someone
(the mishap described in the story)

?

Criteria

Example of Response

1

Essentially no response. No
acknowledgement of distress
or injury or the possibility
of injury.

Child laughed or shrugged.

2

Subject has attended to the
distress or injury or possibility of injury, but offers
nothing. Could include
"don't know" answers or
child's rejection of responsibility.

Subject gave slight laugh and
said "I don't know" (CRYING
LADY), "I would go home"
(BROKEN LEG), "I didn't hurt
herself--she did it by herself" (BROKEN LEG).

3

Verbal acknowledgement of
distress or injury. May include association with
child's own experience or
evidence of empathic distress.

"Tipped over like that--on
their knees" (WAGON), "I had
a broken leg in my bed when
I falled off my bed" (BROKEN
LEG), "I'd cry too" (CRYING
LADY).

4.

Some suggestion for action on
behalf of the victim, remedy
or admonition. Offer of help
or attempt to get help_, nonspecific inquiry. Must be
clear that it is the other,
not self, who suffers.

"I could pick 'em back up
when they fall down" (WAGON),
"I would go tell my--his
father or mother" (WAGON),
"I look in the house and see
what happened."

5

Offer of condolence, verbal
or physical. Inquiry regarding other's condition, using
such words as better, hurt,
all right, OK, directed toward
the victim. Active aid,
clearly directed toward alleviattng distress.

"I would just go over and get
something to wipe the tears
off her--I'd just smile at
her" (CRYING LADY), "Hug her"
(CRYING LADY), "I would say,
'Hey! It's gonna be OK, man,'"
(APPLE TREE), "I would help
'em get up, and run home and
get a band-aid for 'em, and a
washrag" (WAGON)

Score

APPENDIX D

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARIES
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR COMFORTING BEHAVIOR
Source

df

MS

F

Experimental Condition (A)

2

1.583

.718

Sex (B)

1

.003

.001

Age (C)

1

. 02.9

.013

AxB

2

.393

.178

Ax C

2

.400

.181

Bx C

1

3.337

1.513

Ax Bx C

2

2.528

1.146

24

2.206

Error
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE SUMMARY FOR REPORTING
THE CHILD CONFEDERATE'S INJURY
df

Source

MS

F

Experimental Condition (A)

2

.127

.211

Sex (B)

1

.333

.553

Age (C)

1

2.958

4.918*

AxB

3

.109

.181

Ax C

3

.188

.313

Bx C

1

2.003

3.331

Ax Bx C

2

.123

- . 205

23

.601

Error

*

p <

.OS

S3:SX'1VNV Hal.I

a xrcrnaa:av

b

a

1
.24

2

.11

.40**

.14

4

s~gnificance.

.18

-.14

3

.25

3

.15

.29

4
1

-

1

3

-

-

-.06

.51***-.22

2
--

4

.04

.28

2

-

.43**

.20

3

.50***

.37**

.35*

4

.41**

-

-

2
1

-

• 28

.15

3

* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001

.15

.58**

.27

4

Awareness of DiscreEancy

.45**

.33*

Projective Judgment

Measures Using Incongruent Items

2
-c

ExElanation of Affect

c Correlation coefficients could not be computed for this item because scores did not vary.

b N = 36.
N = 35.

a

1.

EmEathic Judgment

Note: One-tailed tests of

3. Ball
4. Falla

a

2. Ice Cream

1. Tigerb

Items

4. Food

b

3. Darkb.

2. Good-bye

1. Gifta

Items

Social ComErehension

Measures Using Congruent Items

ITEM INTERCORRELATIONS FOR THE FIVE TASK 1 MEASURES

-~~~--~-~---~~~~~~~

co
~

.88***
.84***

.70***
.91***

-

.65***
.68***

-

• 77***

.67***

N = 36 for all items; one-tailed tests of significance.

* p < • 05
** p < .01
*** p < .001

Note:

6. Apple Tree

5. Broken Leg

4. Wagon

3. Crying Lady

.66***

.54***

.60***

.32*

-

2. Picnic

.37*

.29*

6

.44**

5

-

4

1. Beach

3

2

1

Items

Social ComErehension
3

.39**

4

.58***

.41**

5

.51***

.60***

.49***

6

- - Intervention Strategies

ITEM INTERCORRELATIONS'FOR THE TWO TASK 2 MEASURES

00
VI

-- -- - - - ---- - - ----

- - ___.

Measure

·------·~

- .. ·--·· ..

---·.
~---------

4. 76*b

F
df

-F

3,96

df

5.09***

F

Items (C)
df

1,32
1,32

Explanation
of Affect

Awareness of
Discrepancy

1,32

Intervention
Strategies
4.47*b

10.05***b

13.0***b

10.0l***b

3, 96

3,96

3,96

3.25*

7.84****

2.85*

*

p < .05;

**

p < .01;

***

p < .005; **** p < .001.

~ Mean scores were higher for girls than for boys.
Older children had higher mean scores than younger children.

1,32

Social
Comprehension

Task 2

1,32

Social
Comprehension

3,96

df

Ax B

Projective
Judgment
8.03**a

F

Age (B)

5.49***

2. 82* .

F

Ax C

Within Subjects

3,96

1,32

df

Sex (A)

Between Subjects

Source

Empathic
Judgment

Task 1

~-

................
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df

4.39***

2.88*

F

Bx C

...
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-F

AxBxC
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